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Abstract  Italy has experienced a restructuring and consolidation process in the banking industry since the 
1990s’ that is expected to foster efficiency and competition. Despite the reforms, a peculiarity of the 
industry is the persistence of small mutual-cooperative banks (BCCs) active in narrowed markets. The 
scope of this paper is to evaluate the level and the dynamics of BCC efficiency compared with other bank-
types and to analyze its main determinants over the period 2006-2011. Efficiency is firstly estimated with 
stochastic frontiers and then used as dependent variable in fixed and random effects models that have been 
run to regress BCC efficiency against individual and environmental factors. The latter are meant to gauge 
the structure of the provincial banking market, that is to say the reference market of BCCs. Results show 
that BCCs perform better than other banks, even though efficiency has decreased over time, owing to the 
effect of the current crisis. Furthermore, BCC efficiency increases with market concentration and demand 
density and decreases as bank branches increase in local markets. This holds whatever the frontier (cost or 
profit). Finally, local development negatively affects (only) cost efficiency, while BCCs gain in generating 
profits when systemic credit risk increases. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Italian banking industry has observed very strong deregulation and consolidation processes over 
the last two decades, like many other countries. The major reforms go back to the 1990s' when the 
1990 Amato-Carli Act, the EU Directive II and the 1993 Consolidated Act entered into force and were 
motivated by the attempt to increase consolidation and market competition. An interesting 
deregulation reform was the relaxing of geographic constraints, allowing banks to open branches 
throughout the country. The implied fact is a territorial diversity in bank organization and an increase 
in competition in even very narrowed local markets.
1
  
The outcome of the overall process of reforms can be documented from different perspectives. 
For instance, the  number of banks has reduced drastically over time: there were 1037 in 1993 and 693 
in 2013. At the same time, the increase in bank-branches has been remarkable (there were 22133 in 
1993 and 32106 in 2013). A fast “bankarization” of the territory took place: the proportion of 
municipalities with at least one bank branch increased from 46.43% to 74.23% over the 1993-2014 
period. As far as ownership is concerned, Italy experienced a transformation from public-owned banks 
to private banks with the result that nowadays the banking system comprises only private cooperatives 
and joint stock companies (Ltd.). A clear cut-off signal of the reform comes from the market 
concentration: as consolidation proceeds through a massive number of Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A), the market shares of the top-5 banking-groups acting as leaders increased from 36% in 1996, 
to 50% in 2000 and  64% to in 2013. In brief, the current market configuration is with (a) several big 
banks operating throughout the country  - among which the largest act as big players even in 
international markets,  (b) a growing number of medium-sized cooperative banks organized mostly in 
the form of “Popolari” Banks and (c) the network of small mutual-cooperative banks (Banche di 
Credito Cooperativo, henceforth BCCs). 
These facts clearly suggest that the current Italian banking sector has changed profoundly. 
However, one of its most interesting peculiarities is the permanence of a plethora of BCCs which 
coexist with all the other entities that regularly tend to become bigger and bigger and expand their 
activities in every segment of the national market. Thus, BCC survival appears to be threatened by 
two main forces. Firstly, in the new market a crucial role is played by complex financial 
conglomerates, which force the disappearance of small entities. In a world of big-banks, small credit 
institutions are expected to disappear. Secondly, BCCs historically operated in narrow isolated local 
markets, which, now, are no longer protected because the regulatory barriers to geographic expansion 
have been removed. If local markets become contestable, then it is expected that BCCs will lose their 
quasi-monopoly power which, in the past, assured a certain degree of profitability. However, it is 
worth pointing out that a radical transformation also regarded BCCs. A signal of this is their reduction 
in number: at the end of 2013 there were 385 (411 in 2011), while in the early 90s’ there were 700. 
These figures indicate that the restructuring of the credit market has not ruled out the BCCs, which 
have embarked on a process of M&A to increase their size. However, the consolidation process in the 
network of cooperative-mutual organizations occurred involving mostly BCCs, with the result that the 
number of BCC branches even doubled in ten years, moving from 2226 in 1993 to 4454 in 2013. In 
relative terms, in 2013 BCC branches made up 14% of total national branches, which is a value 4 
percentage points higher than that of 1993. This process surely reinforces BCCs territorial vocation, 
which tends to expand their relative role and participation in small markets. In other words, data 
                                                 
1
 The process of institutional reforms has been regulated by several norms, such as, for instance, the 2002 
budget law, the 262/2005 law and the 353/2006 Legislative Decree. Details on these reforms are in Giannola 
(2009), Messori et al. (2003) and Silipo (2009). 
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indicate that BCCs reacted to the national restructuring process by re-organizing their network 
through within-group M&A and thus increasing their presence in local markets. 
Based on these arguments, it becomes meaningful to investigate BCC performance, given that 
they operate within a national banking industry, which, now, is much more concentrated and 
consolidated than in the past. In order to address its main research question, this article combines two 
strands of the literature, one focusing on the evaluation of bank efficiency, the other investigating the 
determinants of efficiency.  
Despite the huge literature on bank efficiency  - see, among many others, the exhaustive 
surveys by Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Fethi and Pasourias (2010) -  few papers have focused 
on Italy (Battaglia et al. 2010; Dongili et al. 2008; Fontani and Vitali 2007; Giannola et al. 1997; 
Giannola and Scarfiglieri 1998; Girardone et al. 2004). In this regard, the evidence is mixed, but three 
main conclusions can be drawn from these studies. Larger Italian banks attain lower efficiency levels 
than small banks. Bank efficiency is higher in the North of Italy than in the South. Interestingly for the 
purpose of this paper, a common result from many papers is that Italian mutual-cooperatives perform 
better than other banks in controlling costs.
2
 This outcome is often explained by the competitive 
advantages that BCCs have over big-banks in terms, for example, of (a) the use of soft instead of hard-
information, (b) lean rather than complex organization and (c) because of the short operational 
distance between banks and customers (see, i.e., Alessandrini et al. 2009; Berger et al. 2005; 
Carnevali 2005).  
With regards to the theme of “what” explains bank efficiency, it is noteworthy that there is no 
clear widely-shared theory, but much is left to empirics. This helps to explain why the results are 
contrasting and often not comparable, as - at best -  model specifications differ from one study to 
another, reflecting the paper-specific aim. For instance, much research regards the  relationship 
between efficiency and market concentration, socio-economic external conditions, banking structure, 
and access to banking services (Battaglia et al. 2010; Bos and Kool 2006: Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas 
2000; Girardone et al. 2004). While part of this literature will be reviewed in the set-up of our model 
(see Hughes and Mester (2008) for a comprehensive survey on this topic), here, it is important to say 
that the main focus of this paper, after controlling for the role of BCC specific factors, is the effect on 
BCC performance exerted by environmental factors. In this sense, the paper by Battaglia et al. (2010) 
is comparable with our work, as it focuses on the efficiency of BCCs over the 2000-2005 period. They 
estimate stochastic frontiers by referring only to the sample of BCCs and thus proposing ‘within-the-
group’ differences rather than providing efficiency scores retrieved from the estimations of national 
banking frontiers. As the authors argue, their method allows them to “…avoid estimation bias in 
efficiency scores to strong heterogeneity in the sample” (Battaglia et al. 2010:1366). At this point of 
the discussion, it is also worth mentioning that Battaglia et al (2010) calculate the external variables at 
regional level. On one hand, their main results suggest that cost or profit efficiency is insensitive to 
non-performing loans and regional GDP per capita; on the other hand, cost efficiency decreases with 
high spatial concentration of the local banking industry and increases with the number of branches. 
With respect to the related literature, our paper is innovative in several ways. The first 
distinguishing feature refers to the empirical setting we propose. In the first step, cost and profit 
efficiency scores are estimated within the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) by following the 
specification proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995)
3
 and, above all, considering all Italian banks. 
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 This result is found in Ayadi et al. (2009), Battaglia et al. (2010), Giannola et al. (1997), Giannola and 
Scarfiglieri (1998), Girardone et al. (2004), Giordano and Lopes (2006), Giordano and Lopes (2012), Fontani 
and Vitali (2007), Dongili et al. (2008) and Turati (2004).  
3
 The choice of considering both dimensions of efficiency (cost and profit) overcomes the limits arising from 
analysing only one of them. Indeed, profit efficiency only gauges performance properly if banks’ objectives 
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Differently from Battaglia et al. (2010), our estimations of BCC individual performances control for 
what happens in the national banking system. In other words, BCCs are analyzed within the overall 
industry, with the result of preserving the comparability of efficiency across different groups of banks. 
This allows discernment “within” and “between” group differences.4 In the second step of the 
analysis, the BCC efficiency scores are regressed against a set of individual and external variables that 
can exert an effect on BCC performance. In this regard, the main interest is to evaluate the effect of 
local banking conditions that are measured through several determinants defined at provincial level. 
This introduces the second important contribution of the study, which regards the choice to consider 
the province (NUTS3) as the reference geographical area of BCCs. An analysis based on larger 
territories, for example regions, could suffer from aggregation bias, as it is plausible to think that the 
greater the proximity of BCCs to markets the more precise will be the investigation of the individual 
efficiency-environment nexus. Briefly, the choice to focus on BCCs and limiting the territory of 
interest to provincial level allows a better understanding of the role of local market conditions on 
individual performance, which remains the main scope of this research. This is why BCCs are the 
only category of banks operating in spatially-bounded markets, acting as single market entities.  From 
an empirical point-of-view and differently from the case of big-banks, the required statistical 
information to be analyzed comes from the BCCs balance-sheet, the contents of which are reliable 
from the point of view of a territorial study. Indeed, the accounting-data incorporate the environmental 
effects, as they are the result of the financial relationship between BCCs and the “residents”.5 
Therefore, the research-question on “whether and how” the BCC efficiency is determined by 
environmental factors becomes intriguing because it sheds some light on the relationship between the 
effects of the restructuring process of the entire Italian industry and the performance of the financial 
entities operating in local markets. Another aspect of interest is related to the period under scrutiny, 
which covers the years between 2006 and 2011. This was a period of severe instability in financial 
markets which has not been deeply studied in terms of the effects on the efficiency of Italian mutual-
cooperative banks (the exception is Barra et al 2014). The present paper contributes to fill this gap 
firstly by updating the analysis of the level and the dynamics of BCC performance compared with 
others and secondly by modeling time as a determinant of BCCs efficiency.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reports some stylized facts on the banking 
industry; Section 3 describes the method used to estimate banking efficiency and reports the frontier 
estimations; Section 4 discusses the estimated efficiency scores of BCCs compared to other bank-
types; Sections 5 focuses on the determinants of BCC performance; finally, Section 6 concludes. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
are restricted to profit maximisation. However, banks tend to minimise costs. According to some authors 
profit efficiency is superior to cost efficiency “for evaluating the overall performance of the firm” (Berger 
and Humphrey 1997; Berger and Mester 1997; Fitzpatrick and McQuinn 2005). This view is intuitively based 
on the fact that profit derives from the maximisation of a function which depends on revenues and costs. It 
must be also said that profit efficiency requires not only technical efficiency and both input and output 
allocative efficiency (as does the cost efficiency), but also an appropriate scale. Thus, banks cannot be profit 
efficient if they are scale inefficient (Berger and Mester 1997). While profits maximisation is not the ultimate 
scope of mutual-cooperative banks, the above arguments hold even for this bank-type as their competitive 
advantages over big-banks may translate to higher profitability (see, i.e. Ayadi et al 2009; Iannotta et al. 
2007).  
4 As Bos and Kool (2006) argue, studies which  do not take into account differences between bank-type yield 
inappropriate conclusions about bank performance. On the contrary, by using a wide sample of banks allows 
net efficiency measures to predict how BCCs are ranked under the assumption that banks operate in an 
equivalent environment. 
5
 The relationship between individual efficiency and external determinants might be evaluated at branch level, 
whatever the bank-type.  However, data at branch level are not available in Italy - as well as in many other 
countries - because they are classified as sensitive-statistics.  
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2. Local banking markets in Italy: some facts 
 
As our main scope is to explain BCC efficiency by distinguishing between environmental and 
individual factors, this section documents some of recent developments that have occurred in local 
Italian markets. The discussion is conducted at provincial level (NUTS3), which is the geographical 
disaggregation mostly closer to the operating scale of mutual-cooperative banks. Throughout the 
paper, reference is made to the period 2006-2011 because of the greater reliability of the micro-data.
6
 
 An important effect of the restructuring reform is the spatial diffusion of financial services. 
Several proxies can be used as an indicator of this. For instance, the number of branch banks in each 
province is, on average, 328 over the 2006-2011 period. The maximum (2141 branches) is observed in 
Milan, while Ogliastra is the province with the lowest number (26) of bank branches. Another useful 
index is the bank branches by square kilometer, which measures the density by province. The density 
is considerably different across provinces [it varies from 0.2 (Crotone) to 12.9 (Milan) in 2006-2011, 
appendix table A1], although it is stable over time (Figure 1.a). Another valuable indicator is the ratio 
“Bank Branches/Municipalities” per province, which was, on average, more than 5 in 2006-2011 and 
ranges from more than 20 branches per municipality in the provinces of Trieste and Prato to less than 
one branch in the provinces of Isernia, Oristano and Vibo Valentia (table A1). Along this line of 
reasoning, further evidence comes from the concentration of provincial markets. Figure 1.b reports the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index calculated using the number of branches per bank (HH1) in every 
province by year. Table A1 displays the average over the period 2006-2011. What emerges is that the 
concentration is quite time invariant (fig. 1.b), but huge differences across provinces still persist. For 
instance, the average of HH1 over the years 2006-2011 was 0.12 (table A1). The index HH1 ranges 
from the highest values (higher than 0.5) in the provinces of Nuoro and Oristano to the lowest (0.036) 
which is observed for Trento.  It is low (less than 0.1) in many other provinces. Higher average market 
concentration has been revealed when considering total bank assets (HH2).
7
 In this case, the average 
value of HH2 is 0.36 (three times higher than the average of HH1) varying from 0.23 (Parma) and 
0.59 (Como). Importantly, when using HH2 an increasing market concentration is observed over time 
(Figure 1.c). Finally, there has been a relevant increase of big-bank participation in the periphery. The  
top-3 national banks - as revealed by the total assets averaged over 2010-2011 -  owned 21% of bank 
branches operating in every Italian province. The 3 largest banks own more than 40% of bank 
branches in the province of Aosta, Siena and Turin. On the contrary, in Bolzano, Macerata, Pesaro-
Urbino Pescara, Teramo, Chieti, Crotone, Matera, Potenza, Nuoro and Oristano the presence of the 
largest 3 banks is modest, as they own less than 10% of branches operating in those provinces. The 
role of big-banks in local markets is more apparent when looking at their total assets shares. The top-3 
banks absorbed (on average) 73% of  total assets at provincial level in 2006-2011. The territorial 
distribution of this market share shows a minimum of 51% in Benevento and a maximum in Siena 
                                                 
6
 Two different data-aggregations are needed for addressing the issues we pose. The first concerns data at bank 
level, while the second regards the geographical aggregation we refer to. Data on individual bank are from 
the Italian Banking Association (ABI). When considering the provincial level (NUTS3) we use different data 
sources (Bank of Italy, Italian Institute of Statistics, Istituto Tagliacarne). The period under scrutiny covers 
the years 2006-2011. This is why the implementation of International Accounting Standards (IAS) occurred 
in 2005 and banks balance sheets before-and-after IAS are not comparable. 
7
 Data needed to calculate HH2 is the value of total assets by the i-th bank in every province j (TAij). Because 
this information is not freely available in Italy, as well as in many other countries, we proceed through this 
calculation: TAij=TAi*bij, where TAi is the balance-sheet amount of Total Asset (TA) of the i-th bank and bij 
is the proportion of branches of bank i in province j (bij=BBij/BBj). This procedure is proposed by Carbò 
Valverde et al. (2003). 
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(more than 90%). It is worth pointing out that in 22 out of 103 Italian provinces, the top-3 national 
banks absorb more than 80% of local total assets (table 1).
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Another issue concerns the traditional function of banks, namely the transformation of deposits 
into loans. The Bank of Italy provides the required data taking into account the residence/location of 
customers and depositors. Appendix table A1 and Figure 1.d summarize this information. High values 
of this ratio mean that the provincial banking sector is issuing out more of its deposits in loans at 
provincial level, which, in turn, means it releases more income. Over 2006-2011 the ratio 
Loans/Deposits is on average 1.55. On the one hand, the highest value (3) results in Milan. Again, 
calculations show that in several provinces (Ancona, Bergamo, Bolzano, Florence, Lucca, Modena, 
Prato, Reggio Emilia, Ravenna, Rimini, Siena and Vicenza) the banking industry provides a number 
of loans to residents which is more than double deposits from the same area. On the other hand, Aosta, 
Trieste, Avellino, Benevento, Brindisi, Reggio Calabria, Vibo Valentia, Agrigento, Caltanisetta, 
Nuoro and Oristano are the provinces in which loans are smaller than deposits. It is interesting to 
point out that the distribution of Loans/Deposits ratio reproduces the North-South dualism of the 
Italian economy, being high in the Northern provinces and low (except Aosta and Trieste) in Southern 
provinces. A related issue to offering funds is that loans are not always repaid.  In Italy, bad 
performing loans are 6.38% of total loans over 2006-2011, with a different incidence across 
provinces. In some provinces (Milan, Sondrio and Siena), bad-loans are low (less than 2%), while 
they are very high (more than 10% of total loans) in Avellino, Benevento, Caserta, Crotone, 
Caltanissetta, Enna,  Frosinone, Isernia, Latina, Nuoro, Potenza, Reggio di Calabria, Taranto, Vibo 
Valentia and with a peak of 18.44% in Matera. Finally, there is also great heterogeneity when looking 
at the credit provided by banks. This result from the loans-to-GDP ratio which ranges from the high 
values observed in Milan (3.45), Siena (2.50) and Florence (1.84) to the lowest values (less than 50% 
of provincial Value Added) registered in Oristano, Enna, Vibo Valentia, Reggio Calabria, Isernia, 
Brindisi, Benevento, Rieti and Frosinone (table A1) 
From the above discussion one learns that the local banking market conditions are still 
extremely heterogeneous across Italian provinces. This market heterogeneity further motivates the 
understanding of the nexus between the local determinants and BCC efficiency. 
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 Alessandria,  Aosta,  Como, Imperia, Mantova, Milan,  Novara, Pavia, Torino, Belluno, Arezzo, Grosseto, 
Massa, Siena, Lecce, Agrigento, Caltanissetta, Enna, Messina, Ragusa, Siracusa, Trapani. 
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Figure 1 Bank density, market concentration and Loans/Deposits by province (2006-2011) 
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           Source: elaborations on data from Bank of Italy and ISTAT. 
 (b) HH1=Hirschman-Herfindahl index based on the number of branches per bank by province 
 (c) HH2=Hirschman-Herfindahl index based on the total assets per bank by province 
 
 
3 Modeling the stochastic frontiers of banks 
 
3.1 The method 
The econometric analysis is carried out in two steps. Firstly, we consider a very large sample of Italian 
banks and obtain cost and profit efficiency scores by estimating stochastic frontiers using the 
specification proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995). To this end, the main equations (cost or profit 
frontiers) are based on a 3-inputs-3-outputs model, while the inefficiency equation only controls for 
bank type (BCC, Popolari and Ltd.) and location effects. This procedure has two advantages. On the 
one hand, referring to a national banking frontier ensures that results are comparable, in the sense that 
BCC performance is relative to the rest of the industry; on the other hand, the estimated efficiency 
scores are net of any institutional and geographical effect. In the second step of the analysis, BCC 
efficiency obtained in the first step is used as dependent variable of efficiency equations aimed at 
evaluating the effect of individual and local factors on BCC performance. This paragraph briefly 
presents the methodology used to estimate bank frontiers, while the econometric specification of the 
BCC efficiency equation is discussed later (cfr § 5).  
The frontiers are estimated by employing the SFA, that allows banks to be distant from the 
frontier also owing to randomness (Aigner et al. 1977; Meeusen and van de Broek 1977). In this, SFA 
differs from the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) which supposes that the distance from the frontier 
is entirely due to inefficiency. Again, SFA assigns a distribution to the stochastic component of the 
model and, thus, allows inference to be made. Inference, however, is not specific to SFA because of 
advances in bootstrapping in the DEA procedure (Simar and Wilson 2000). A further advantage of 
SFA derives from the specification of Battese and Coelli (1995), which allows a cleaner efficiency 
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measure to be obtained comparing it with the model where one firstly estimates inefficiency using a 
frontier and, secondly, uses the estimated efficiency-score as the dependent variable in subsequent 
regression (Greene 1993). As shown by Lensink and Meesters (2014) and Wang and Schmidt (2002), 
the standard two-step approach suffers from the fact that the inefficiency is assumed to be identically 
and independently distributed in the main frontier equation, while it is determined by other variables 
in the inefficiency equation.
9
 
The following function Fc (.) indicates the cost of producing an output y given a price w, 
whereas Fp (.) states the profit obtainable from producing y at input price w. 
  cc uvcit eewyFCost ,                                                 [1] 
  pp uvpit eewyF

 ,Profit                                           [2] 
 Eq. [2] is an alternative profit function since it depends on inputs and outputs, whereas actual 
profits depend on the prices of output. It uses the same variables as the cost function, implying that 
output-prices are free to vary (Huizinga et al., 2001). Exhaustive discussions on alternative versus 
traditional profit efficiency are in Berger and Mester (1997) and Vander-Vennet (2002). 
From eq. [1] the efficiency can be expressed as the ratio of the minimum cost of a potentially 
efficient bank to the cost actually observed: 
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Similarly, profit efficiency is the ratio of the observed banks profit to the maximum level of profit 
achievable in the case of full efficiency 
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[4] 
We use the Translog function to model the frontiers. It satisfies the assumptions of non-negativity, 
concavity and linear homogeneity (Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000). After taking into account the 
constraint of homogeneity
10
 in relation to input-prices ( 1
n
n ), the cost frontier in the log-linear 
form (wr is the price of deposits) is:                                                     
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 Following Battese and Coelli (1995) allows us to address the issues brought up by Lensink and Meesters 
(2014) and Wang and Schmidt (2002). Phrased differently, we use a variant of the SFA traditional two-step 
approach, as in the first step we basically exploit all the advantages provided by the stochastic frontiers 
specification proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995), while the common use of two-step procedure refers to 
Battese and Coelli (1992). 
10
 Using a translog, linear homogeneity also requires standard symmetry ( sjjs    and qnnq   ) and linear 
restrictions of the cost (or profit) function ( 0
n
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n
nj ).  
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where Cost is total bank costs; yj represents the j-th output, with j=1,2,3; wn is the cost of the n-th 
input, with n=1,2,3; α, β and ω are the parameters to be estimated; u is the inefficiency; v is the 
random error. 
With regard to profits, the right-hand side replicates the cost function, while the dependent 
variable is bank profit, expressed as 






rw
Profit
log . As in  Berger and Mester (1997), Bonin et al. (2005), 
Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2005), Huizinga et al. (2001) and Maudos et al. (2002), profits are 
transformed by adding the absolute value of minimum profit plus one to actual profits. This ensures 
that  



  1loglog minProfit  is defined in  ,0 . 
Finally, we assume that vit is normally distributed with mean zero and uit is distributed as a 
truncated normal. Again, vit and uit are independently and identically distributed: 
vit ~ iidN (0, 
2
v
 )                                                               [6] 
uit ~ N
 +
 (z’η, 2
u
 )                                                             [7] 
where z’η is the linear predictor of inefficiency.11 The econometric specification of the inefficiency 
component is: 
 itsouthcentrepopltdit ezzzzu  4321                                                   [8] 
where Zltd and Zpop are two dummy variables equal to unity if the i-th bank belongs to the group of 
Ltd. or Popolari, respectively (the base group comprises the BCC), whereas Zcentre and Zsouth are equal 
to unity if the headquarter of the i-th bank is in the Centre or in the South of Italy (the base group is 
formed by banks located in the North of the country). These dummy variables guarantee that the 
efficiency scores are net of any geographical and institutional fixed effect. Moreover, eit is the erratic 
component. Finally, efficiency is time-variant, ensuring a change in relative ranking among banks. In 
other words, this accommodates the case where an initially inefficient bank becomes more efficient 
over time.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 As in many other recent papers in the banking efficiency literature (see, i.e.,  Battaglia et al. 2010; Giordano 
and Lopes 2008; Lensink and Mester 2012) the assumptions on vit and uit are those originally proposed by 
Battese and Coelli (1995), also because modeling other “possible correlated structures of the technical 
inefficiency effects and the random errors in the frontier” (Battese and Coelli 1995:327) goes beyond the 
scope of this work. 
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3.2  Frontier estimations: a brief comment  
 
The data source used to estimate the efficiency is ABI (Italian Banking Association), which comprises 
the balance sheets of 96% Italian banks. All individual bank variables are extracted used to estimate 
the 3-inputs-3-outputs frontier models (eq. [5]). Appendix table A2 displays the variables used in 
defining the frontiers, which were modeled by referring to the intermediation approach (Sealey and 
Lindley 1977). Appendix table A3 reports the summary statistics. Regressions were performed 
through the simultaneous estimation of eq. [5] and [8] and were run by using more than 3700 bank-
observations. Results from estimating the cost and the profit frontiers are in table 1.
 
  
After observing that the coefficients of the Translog frontiers are almost all significant,
12
 the 
first meaningful result regards gamma, which is the ratio of the variance of the inefficiency to the 
variance of the composite error. The estimated gamma parameter is always high, indicating that 
inefficiency significantly contributes to determine the distance from the frontier. This evidence is 
confirmed by the Likelihood Ratio test, which verifies the correct model specification of an SFA. It 
considers the Ho that all the parameters in eq. [8] are equal to zero: if this hypothesis is accepted, then 
the OLS estimates will be consistent because the composite error comprises only randomness. Results 
indicate that the LR is 47.814 and 1664.7 in cost and profit frontiers respectively and, therefore, Ho is 
rejected at 1% (table 1).  
With regards the results related to eq.[8], it is also important to underline that the dummy 
variable ZLtd has a positive sign, implying that the average level of efficiency (cost or profit) is higher 
for BCCs than for Ltd., while the sign of Zpop coefficient is positive in the cost function (implying that 
BCCs obtain higher cost efficiency levels than Popolari) and negative in the profit frontier (meaning 
that BBCs achieve lower profit efficiency levels than Popolari). Passing to explain the geographical 
effect, banks with their main office in the Centre of Italy obtain lower inefficiency levels than banks 
of Northern Italy (for both cost and profit aspects), while some territorial differences exist as far as 
profit is concerned, as northern banks register profit efficiency lower than southern banks.  
 
                                                 
12
 We implement an LR test to verify the correctness of the Cobb-Douglas versus the Translog. Under H0 there 
is the more parsimonious model, which is always rejected at 1%. 
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Table 1 Banking Frontiers in Italy. Translog estimates in 2006-2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   Significance levels: ‘***’ = 0.01; ‘**’ = 0.001; ‘*’ = 0.05; ‘.’ = 0.1; ‘ ‘ = 1. 
                                          + 1% LR critical value as in Kodde and Palm (1986) 
                                             Source: see table 1 
 
 Cost Profit 
β0 -3.713*** 9.803*** 
β1 (Loans) 0.729*** 0.159*** 
β2 (Commission Income) -0.241*** -0.245*** 
β3 (Securities) 0.442***         0.096 . 
ω1 (Labor Cost/Cost of Deposits) 1.128*** 1.093*** 
ω2 (Cost of capital/Cost of Deposits) 0.344***         0.168 . 
β11 0.092***      0.006** 
β12 -0.100*** -0.023*** 
β13 -0.086*** 0.025*** 
β22 0.056***         0.002 
β23        -0.004             -0.014 . 
β33 0.047***      0.014** 
ω11        -0.025 .          0.015 
ω12 -0.095*** -0.107*** 
ω22 0.122*** 0.082*** 
α11 -0.060*** -0.030*** 
α12 0.084*** 0.055*** 
α13 -0.030*** -0.044*** 
α21 0.068*** 0.035*** 
α22 -0.065*** -0.043*** 
α23         0.008 0.031*** 
   
ZLtD 0.092***          0.096** 
ZPop 0.157*** -0.372*** 
Zcentre -0.127*** -0.385*** 
Zsouth         0.032 -0.675*** 
   
2  0.064*** 0.169*** 
2
2


 u  0.323*** 0.901*** 
Log-likelihood 229.414 188.918 
LR test 47.814*** 1664.7*** 
 (14.33)
+
 (14.33)
+
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4. The estimated efficiency scores: BCCs versus other bank-types 
 
This section focuses on the estimated efficiency scores retrieved from the estimations of cost and 
profit frontiers. The analysis aims to understand better BCC performance compared to the other banks. 
In this, the advantage of having considered the entire sample of banks in the estimations of national 
frontiers is exploited. A brief investigation is conducted into what extent BCC efficiency differs from 
the rest of the sample and this discussion is complemented by calculating some balance-sheet ratios.
13
  
The average estimated values of cost and profit efficiencies and of balance-sheets ratios by 
bank-type are summarized in table 2.
14
 Data indicates that mutual-cooperative banks dominated the 
industry, as they amount to on average 63% of the sample. Moreover, it emerges that bank size ranges 
from 7,029M euro in 2006 to 7,884M euro in 2011. In this respect, mutual-cooperative entities are 
very small compared to the others. Their size is, on average, 286M Euro, which is about thirty times 
smaller than the average size of other banks (7,884M Euro). Data also suggest that BCCs activities are 
not diversified. This holds either in terms of income diversification (the ratio is, on average, 0.23 for 
BCC, 0.36 for others) or loans diversification (0.33 versus 0.38).  The ability to transform Deposits 
into Loans is lower for BCCs than others (on average 1.49 versus 2.48). Interestingly, the ratio 
Equity/Total Assets of BCCs is significantly lower than that observed for the other two bank groups: 
on average, it is 0.015 for BCCs and 0.098 for others. This implies that BCC show a higher financial 
dependence than others, regardless of assets risk unlike the regulatory capital ratios.  
While table 2 highlights the existence of marked differences in banking behavior, further 
interesting evidence comes form a deep-analysis of efficiency scores. Indeed, BCCs result to perform 
better than other banks whatever the frontier. On average, cost efficiency is 0.90 for BCCs and 0.87 
for other banks. This implies that, in order to be full efficient, BCCs should reduce the inputs of only 
10% offering the same banking services (or similarly they should increase outputs of 10% with the 
same inputs). This proportion is 13% for the counterpart. Moreover, on average, BCCs earned 85% of 
their potential profits: a 15% recovery of profitability would have been possible without increasing 
inputs. This estimated performance is better than that obtain for the other banks, which record a profit 
efficiency of 79%, that is six percentage points less than BCC profitability. In brief, Italian BCCs 
perform better than other banks either when they control costs or generate profits. As can be seen from 
table 3, this evidence holds even year-by-year: the average level of cost efficiency is 83% for BCCs 
and 75% for the others in 2006, declines up to 2008 and shows a slight even irregular recovery in the 
two subsequent years. In 2011, the distance in terms of cost efficiency, between BCCs and the 
counterpart is less than 9% percentage points. There are similar gaps (although less marked than costs) 
when considering annual profit efficiency: the distance is 6 percentage points in 2006 and 7.7 
percentage points at the end of the period, in 2011. These time-changes highlight two stylized-fact. On 
one hand, it is a fact that BCCs and the other banks gain more in controlling costs than in generating 
profits. In other words, over the period under scrutiny Italian banks register high efficiency in saving 
costs. On the other hand, BCCs always perform better than the other banks, in the sense that BCCs 
make better use of inputs and outputs than any other group. 
The difference found in the average values is confirmed when considering the entire 
distributions of cost and profit efficiency. Figure 2 considers all the bank-year-observations and 
reveals a substantial heterogeneity between and within bank-groups. First of all, it is interesting to 
                                                 
13
 The balance-sheet ratios are (a) the income diversification defined as [Income Commissions /(Income 
Commissions+Net Interests Income)]; the loans diversification expressed as (1-Loans/Total Assets); the 
Loans/Deposits ratio and the Equity/Total Assets ratio. 
14
 The initial number with positive values of total assets is 686 in 2006, 692 in 2007, 689 in 2008, 686 in 2009, 
648 in 2010 and 631 in 2011.    
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point out that the density functions of cost efficiency differ from those of profit, whatever the bank: 
cost efficiency is less dispersed  than profit efficiency: standard deviations are 0.0247 and 0.0493 
respectively. This is evident from figure 2. Again, the median cost efficiency is 0.9002, whereas it is 
0.8562 for profits. Finally, for 1% of banks, cost efficiency ranges from 0.7486 and 0.8227, whereas 
the upper value of profit efficiency is 0.7057 for 1% of banks (these data are available upon request).  
  
Table 2 Comparing BCC’s and other banks performance Over the 2006-2011 period. 
 Bank size, efficiency scores and some balance-sheet ratios,  by year 
 
Mutual Cooperative Banks 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2006-2011 
Income Diversification 0.25452 0.20855 0.17811 0.24047 0.24748 0.23898 0.22814 
Loans Diversification 0.34658 0.33555 0.32512 0.32714 0.30569 0.31187 0.32567 
Loans/Deposits 1.29296 1.35194 1.42448 1.38888 1.41727 2.07432 1.48684 
Equity/Total Assets 0.01712 0.01850 0.01594 0.01229 0.01551 0.01263 0.01539 
Cost Efficiency 0.90653 0.89640 0.89382 0.89726 0.89541 0.90531 0.89904 
Profit Efficiency 0.86040 0.85782 0.82451 0.85179 0.85468 0.85087 0.84972 
Size* 241 257 278 301 318 328 286 
# of BCCs** 431 436 428 414 406 404 2519 
        
 
Other Banks 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2006-2011 
Income Diversification 0.42092 0.29260 0.23903 0.39408 0.42302 0.40802 0.36323 
Loans Diversification 0.40031 0.38062 0.38410 0.39782 0.34836 0.35499 0.37861 
Loans/Deposits 2.53152 2.34515 2.39291 1.97645 2.61914 3.08037 2.47589 
Equity/Total Assets 0.09150 0.09214 0.09916 0.10927 0.09836 0.09916 0.09837 
Cost Efficiency 0.87392 0.86392 0.85452 0.86599 0.86703 0.87342 0.86611 
Profit Efficiency 0.80845 0.77537 0.76168 0.78693 0.81755 0.77418 0.78601 
Size* 7,029 7,621 8,132 7,784 7,811 8,621 7,884 
# of other banks** 255 257 261 272 242 227 1514 
Note:  
*   Average value of total assets, expressed as the ratio between the total assets and the number of banks of each 
group. Constant values in M of euro - NIC Index Istat, base year = 1995. 
** The number of banks changes year-by-year because (i) the dataset does not comprise the balance-sheet of 
some minor and small banks in 2010 and 2011; (ii) some banks have ceased to operate; (iii) few banks 
were involved in a very limited number of M&A. 
Source: see Figure 1 
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    Figure 2 Distribution of cost and profit efficiency of Italian banks  
     over the 2006-2011 period.  BCC versus Other Banks  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 The determinants of BCC efficiency 
The results discussed so far indicate that the Italian banking sector is still highly heterogeneous across 
provinces and that the BCCs perform better than others in terms of cost and profit efficiency. This 
paragraph combines these two outcomes and aims at evaluating the role of provincial market 
conditions on BCCs performance. The sub-section 5.1 presents the efficiency equations using once 
cost efficiency, once profit efficiency as dependent variable. The subsections 5.2 and 5.3 focus on the 
impact exerted by individual and territorial factors respectively.  
 
 
51 The efficiency equation 
The efficiency scores range from zero to unity. Thus a Tobit model would be appropriate to estimate 
an efficiency equation, as made by others (Casu and Molyneux 2003; Gillen and Lall 1997; Huang 
and Fu 2013; Jimborean and Brack 2010; Shao and Lin 2001).  However, Tobit models perform well 
only if upper and lower bounds come from non-observability, thereby implying that the variability in 
the range [0;1] does not support itself the use of a Tobit model. Indeed, when no zero and unity 
observations of the dependent variable are in the sample results from Tobit models overlap those 
obtained from standard OLS (Maddala 1991; McDonald 2009). Based on this, the following 
transformation is adopted: CE
TRANS
=ln(CE/(1-CE) and PE
TRANS
=ln(PE/(1-PE)  where CE and PE are 
the cost and profit efficiency scores of BCCs that were retrieved from the joint-estimations of eq. [5] 
and [8] made in the first step of the analysis. Therefore, the efficiency equation is specified as follows: 
it
EITRANS eXXCE
ititit
 210                                                                        [9] 
where 
TRANS
it
CE  is the transformed cost efficiency of the i-th BCC at time t.  X
I
 and X
E
 comprise, 
respectively, a set of individual and environmental variables meant to exert an effect on BCC 
performance. Finally, eit is a random disturbance. When estimating the profit efficiency equation, 
TRANS
it
PE  replicates 
TRANS
it
CE  in eq. [9]. 
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With regard to the right-hand side variables of eq. [9], it is worth noticing that the efficiency 
determinants defined at bank level are related to the capital structure, size and diversification of BCCs 
activities, while the variables at provincial level are meant to gauge the relationship between 
efficiency and market concentration, spatial diffusion of banking services, density of demand,  credit 
risk and the role of economic development of each province. 
 The empirical strategy followed to estimate eq. [9] is to apply random effects and fixed effects 
models and to control for endogeneity by considering the Hausman-Taylor specification. Table 3 
displays the results. The first three columns of data report the estimates obtained when considering the 
equation of cost efficiency. In more detail, column 1 presents  the estimates from a random effects 
model, column 2 refers to results from fixed effects model, while column 3 shows the Hausman-
Taylor estimates. Columns 3-6 replicate for profit efficiency. 
Before presenting the results regarding the role played by each efficiency determinant, it is 
important to provide some diagnostics on the estimated model. The choice of the best performing 
model deserves comment. To this end we consider two tests. The Hausman test is conducted to assess 
the appropriateness of random or fixed effects models. Failure to reject Ho indicates that the random 
specification is valid. Results are in favor of fixed effect specification, whatever the BCC efficiency 
equation (cost or profit). Furthermore, the Hausman-Taylor specification is compared with the fixed 
effects model. In the Hausman-Taylor specifications, all variables at bank level are treated as 
endogenous, while environmental variables are assumed to be exogenous.
15
 Even in this case, the test 
supports the fixed effect model, given that the difference in estimated coefficients are not statistically 
different. This implies that bank-level variables may be treated as exogenous. Before discussing the 
role of individual and local banking determinants, it is remarkable to highlight that the coefficient of 
Time is always negative, thereby implying that during the years of the current crisis the BCCs register 
significant efficiency losses. It is a result to be better investigated, as made by Barra et al. (2014).     
 
 
5.2 The role of individual factors  
This section presents the estimates obtained when analyzing the effect on efficiency exerted by BCCs 
individual characteristics. The first relevant issue regards the efficiency-size nexus. While much 
research documents that efficiency is directly related to size, there is no consensus on the sign of the 
effect. Some authors show that the effect is positive (Andries 2011; Drake 2001), whereas others find 
a negative effect (Pilloff 1996). In our setting, SIZE is measured by the total assets of each BCC.
16
 It 
emerges that cost efficiency tends to increase with size. This indicates that economies of scale are at 
work: following Hauner (2005) it appears that dimension affects the costs of inputs, even in the case 
of BCCs. At the opposite extreme, a contrasting force against dimension comes from BCCs profits, 
which decrease as size increases. Since BCCs do not tend to maximize profits, their tendency to 
become “relatively” bigger ought to be monitored and evaluated only from the perspective of cost 
saving. 
                                                 
15
 BCC individual endogenous variables are instrumented by the difference between the primary variables and 
their time-averaged values, when all the variables are time varying. The endogenous time invariant variables 
are instrumented by the temporal mean of the time varying exogenous variables (Hausman and Taylor, 
1981). The hypothesis of exogeneity of provincial variables is based on the fact that BCCs are very small 
entities and hence their behavior has no effect on local market equilibrium. 
16
 It is important to say that the size-efficiency nexus may not be the same whatever the size, because nonlinear 
effects can arise (Andries 2011; Berger and Mester 1997). To this end, we have augmented the basic equation 
with SIZE
2
 and, alternatively, with the logarithm of SIZE. In both cases, estimations are not significant, 
implying that there is no-linearity (results are available upon request).  
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There are some reasons to consider as relevant the diversification of activities for BCCs 
efficiency. It is argued that income from traditional bank activities suffers lower volatility than other 
financial uses and then the higher the share of risky activities the lower the exposure to systematic risk 
(Vallascas and Keases 2012). However, it is not certain that the higher betas coming from 
diversification compensate the costs for diversifying the sources of income (Baele et al. 2007; Wagner 
2010). This means that there is no expectation on the link between income diversification and BCC 
efficiency. In this paper, diversification is measured as income diversification and loans 
diversification (see table 2). Results from income diversification suggest that the business model 
matters in influencing BCCs efficiency. The analysis shows that income diversification significantly 
affects efficiency, whatever the frontier. The estimated coefficients result to be positive in cost and 
profit regressions, implying that Italian BCCs would gain from diversifying their business other than 
intermediation within the income statement (income diversification). With regard to loan 
diversification the effect remains positive on profit efficiency, and reverses on cost efficiency. From 
this, it appears that BCCs would save costs by offering traditional services (loans) to their member-
customers, while they obtain profit-benefits as their investment portfolio is unbalanced in favor of 
non-traditional lending activities (loans diversification).  
Another aspect that the study addresses is the relationship between efficiency and the capital 
structure. Indeed, the financial capital is related to exposure to risk in a sense that the more indebted a 
bank the higher the risk of failure that arises in situations of systemic crisis (Acharya and Viswanathan 
2011). In other words, less equity implies higher risk taken and greater leverage which results in 
higher borrowing costs. Again, a high level of leverage directly affects funding costs, since paid 
interests imply less profitability for the bank in the income statement (Berger and Mester 1997). From 
these arguments, it is reasonable to assume that more leveraged BCCs face high funding costs and 
then low efficiency scores. In our regressions the capital structure is proxied by the ratio Equity/Total 
Assets, which ranges from 0 (highly leveraged BCC) to 1 (financial independence). From an empirical 
point of view, the equity-to-total assets ratio is found to effect negatively on cost efficiency, while the 
relationship is positive for  profit efficiency. On the costs side, this means that an increased amount of 
capital, for instance as requirements of regulation, can act as a binding restriction and thus is 
perceived by BCCs as a cost. Furthermore, the evidence also confirms that the most indebted BCCs 
register high financial cost and thus low cost-efficiency.  
   
 
5.3 The role of environmental factors 
Turning back to the specific objective of the paper, it is worth discussing the empirics about how the 
provincial market conditions effect BCC performance. The discussion begins with  market 
concentration, which enters into regressions to gauge the effect of consolidation process observed in 
banking markets. It is measured using the Herfindahl Index and Total Assets (HH2) in each province, 
as  defined and discussed in section 2. This is an issue addressed in many works (Casu and Girardone 
2009; Dongili et al. 2008; Fontani and Vitali 2007) aimed at verifying whether a higher industry 
concentration influences bank efficiency. The uncertainty of the outcome is due to the fact that, on the 
one hand, the operations of consolidation have resulted in an increase in size with an eye to probable 
and expected increases in efficiency levels. On the other hand, high concentration can cause an 
increase in banks market power and, therefore, a reduction of banks efficiency (Turati 2008). It 
appears that local banking concentration is positively related to BCCs efficiency. It is a robust 
evidence, provided that it holds in cost and profit frontiers, suggesting that BCCs operating in 
provinces with more concentrated banking markets show higher efficiency. This is consistent with the 
efficient structure hypothesis (Berger 1995; Goldberg and Rai 1996). Phrased differently, in local 
concentrated banking markets, each BCC is induced to be more and more efficient, exploiting 
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economies of scales and thus acquiring stronger market positions in their narrowed reference markets. 
This explains and motivates the sign on the estimated parameter: in provinces with high market 
concentration there would be a dominance of efficient BCCs. Arguments that increased market 
concentration leads to efficiency improvements are also provided by Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 
(2001) and Casu and Girardone (2009).  
 Regarding the spatial access to banking services, it is reasonable to argue that banking 
efficiency in local market can also be affected by the branching that has occurred in Italy over the last 
20 years, after the removal of barriers to expand banking activities. In more detail, it can be expected 
that the higher the number of branches the less BCC efficiency. This is why a large number of 
branches exerts negative effects of individual efficiency because the operating costs to provide 
banking services increase. Moreover, local markets with a high number of branches (in terms of 
spatial dimension) would suffer from over-dimensioning which acts against efficiency. However, the 
sign may be different, as the big-bank participation in small markets can be positive due to the 
increases in the capital brought by big banks, the expertise brought in risk management and increases 
in competition (Delis and Papanikolaou 2009; Hannan and Prager 2009). This phenomenon is 
measured province-by-province with the number of bank branch by square kilometer (cfr figure 1.a). 
Results are in line with the expectation against branching as the estimated parameter of Branch 
Density is always negative. This means that Italian BCCs suffer from the huge branch opening 
process occurring throughout the country. As said before in the Introduction even BCCs have 
contributed to the branching by restructuring their network and then augmenting their role in every 
province. The estimated negative sign might be due to the fact that the presence of many bank 
branches in local markets forces individual BCC to invest increasing amount of resources for serving 
more customers (other than members), whose expectations is to increase the benefits from loans and 
deposits at better advantageous conditions than those applied by other banks. Other things being fixed, 
the increased number of bank branches in local markets and the BCCs strategies act against their costs 
and profits. 
Another issue that the study addresses regards the effect on efficiency due to demand effects. 
The hypothesis is that BCCs that operate in markets with a lower density of demand face higher 
expenses to find customers asking for banking services (Fries and Taci 2005). Thus, the higher the 
density demand, the higher will be the banking efficiency levels. These effects are gauged by the 
demand density expressed as total deposits by square kilometer. From estimations it emerges that 
BCCs cost and profit efficiency is positively related to demand density, whatever the method used to 
estimate eq. [9]. The evidence supports the hypothesis: BCCs working in provinces with high level of 
deposits face, ceteris paribus, lower costs and gain higher profits in mobilizing deposits and making 
loans. 
In order to gauge the effects of systemic market risk on individual efficiency, in eq. [9] is 
inserted the variable Credit Quality, expressed as the bad loans to total loans. It is calculated by taking 
into account the localization of customer in every province. Here, the question is: do BCCs gain or 
lose from operating in local markets with poor credit-quality? It is likely that BCCs operating in risky 
markets are exposed to potential efficiency losses caused by higher costs of screening and monitoring 
activities. Results differ according to the type of efficiency we refer to. On the one hand, individual 
cost efficiency is not related to the local financial markets riskiness. This might be due to the fact that 
BCCs save costs from the nature of the relationship with their member-customers. These relationships 
are long-dated and based on the use of soft-information and protect BCCs from market riskiness. On 
the other side, the risk of local markets positively affects profit efficiency: BCCs charge higher 
interest rates in order to compensate for covering anticipated and unanticipated credit risk. This is in 
line with this expectation (Kasman et al. 2010). Bearing in mind that the study covers a crisis-period 
with a large number of episodes of credit crunch, the highly risky customers, rationed by other banks, 
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borrow from BCCs. In order to receive credit, they are willing to pay higher rates of interest, with  net 
gains for BCC profits. In such a case, the origins of BCC benefits might be the market failures and a 
potential monopoly power in the restricted markets in which they operate. This view is aligned to  
Gutiérrez (2008), but contrasts with Coccorese (2009). 
Finally, it is reasonable to assume that the level of local economic development is an important 
factor of bank performances, because it affects numerous factors related to the demand and supply of 
banking services (mainly deposits and loans). To this end, the income per capita (Y/POP) is used as 
measure of development. It is excepted that provinces with higher Y/POP are assumed to have a 
banking system operating in a mature environment and resulting in more competitive interest rates and 
profit margins. They can also exert more financial activity. Results are mixed. No significant evidence 
comes from profits regressions, while a negative relationship is found between cost efficiency and 
economic development. Evidence from cost efficiency is consistent with the view according to which 
the higher the development of an area the higher the operating and financial costs BCCs would incur 
in offering services (Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas 2000). 
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Table 3  The determinants of BCCs' efficiency. Estimations from RE, FE and HT models (2006-2011) 
 
Dep. Var.:  BCCs' Cost Efficiency 
 
Dep. Var.:  BCCs' Profit Efficiency 
 
Fixed Effect  
Model 
Random Effect  
Model 
Hausman  
Taylor 
 
Fixed Effect  
Model 
Random Effect  
Model 
Hausman  
Taylor 
Intercept 17.731 ** 7.599  19.579 ** 
 
24.491 * 50.375 *** 41.444 *** 
BCCs Individual Level 
             
Size 
             Total Assets 0.262 *** -0.097 ** 0.225 *** 
 
-0.248 * 0.039 
 
-0.250 ** 
Diversification 
             Loans -0.218 *** -0.304 *** -0.191 ** 
 
0.735 *** 0.603 *** 0.707 *** 
Income 1.657 *** 1.553 *** 1.629 *** 
 
0.565 *** 0.793 *** 0.677 *** 
Capital Structure 
             Equity/Total Assets -1.961 *** -1.509 *** -1.936 *** 
 
1.366 *** 0.634 ** 1.234 *** 
              Provincal Level 
             Market concentration 0.069 ** 0.045 ** 0.066 ** 
 
0.130 ** 0.110 ** 0.126 ** 
Credit quality -0.243 
 
-0.255 
 
-0.149 
  
0.959 ** 1.506 *** 1.355 *** 
Demand density 0.001 ** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 
 
0.001 * 0.001 
 
0.001 * 
Branches density -84.140 * -48.634 *** -63.571 *** 
 
-516.053 *** -33.022 
 
-74.186 ** 
GDP per capita -0.008 ** -0.007 * -0.007 ** 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.002 
 
              Time -0.008 ** -0.003   -0.009 **   -0.011   -0.024 *** -0.020 ** 
Obs 2133  2133  2133   2133  2133  2133  
              F-Fisher (p-value) 90.64 (0.000) 
      
23.46 (0.000) 
     
              Wald (p-value) 
  
872.81 (0.000) 
 
962.28 (0.000) 
    
232.06 (0.000) 
 
257.56 (0.000) 
 
              Hausman test (p-value) - 
 
79.25 (0.000) 
 
2.65 (0.915) 
  
- 
 
46.90 (0.000) 
 
18.68 (0.009) 
 Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.001. 
            Source: see table 1. 
P-values are in brackets. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
This paper provides an empirical analysis of cost and profit efficiency of the Italian banking industry 
over the period 2006-2011, which is a time crisis. The central theme is, however, the efficiency of 
BCCs, which, despite the sectorial reforms, remain important players in local markets. This issue is 
addressed from two different perspectives, one focusing on the analysis that generates the bank 
efficiency, one investigating the role of individual and local market-specific factors affecting BCC 
efficiency. Results are threefold. 
Firstly, from stochastic frontier estimations, it is found that BCCs perform, on average, better 
than other banks (commercial and “popolari”) whatever the frontier. In brief, BCCs could use 20% 
less input in order to offer the same level of banking services, while cost inefficiency of other banks is 
28%. As for profits, a 15% recovery of BCC profitability would have been possible without increasing 
inputs (the profit efficiency of the other banks is 6% less than BCC profitability). This evidence 
supports the viability of BCCs in local markets. In same way, our results complement the work by 
Fiordelisi and Mare (2013) who demonstrate, for the period 1997-2009, that the probability of BCC 
survival increases with efficiency (either in terms of costs saving or profits maximization). 
The most important contribution of the article concerns the analysis based on the use of the 
estimated efficiency scores as dependent variables in efficiency equations. This part of the work aims 
at investigating the association of BCC efficiency with individual and local banking market 
characteristics. In this respect, the second evidence is that BCC cost efficiency seems to be inversely 
correlated with the individual financial independence and the loans diversification, while the contrary 
holds regarding income diversification and size. Profits regressions highlight the positive effect of 
diversification (loans and income) and of the equity/total assets ratio. Importantly, the profits of Italian 
BCCs are negatively affected by individual size.  
Thirdly, from the estimates linking BCC performance and the environmental variables several 
points stand out. Over the period 2006-2011, the study emphasizes the positive relationship between 
efficiency and market concentration. Other robust insights come from the demand density and the 
branch density, which positively and negatively affect cost and profit efficiency respectively. The 
evidence from credit quality indicates that BCCs cost efficiency appears not to be related to the 
riskiness of local banking markets, while the opposite holds for BCC profits. This outcome can be 
interpreted as the effect of potential higher interests rates that BCCs charge to “marginal” borrowers 
when these are rationed by other banks. 
While the paper is not centered on the evaluation of deregulation, the result that high 
concentration in local market induce BCCs to be more efficient, should be considered as an 
implication of reforms. In this sense a virtuous-circle seems to be at work: market concentration in the 
periphery makes BCC in those markets be more efficient and then viable. This is in line with the 
intentions of regulators, as the scope to maintain market efficiency is an expected result of market 
consolidation. At the same time, BCC viability preserves the small market to be served. However, the 
negative effect of branching on BCC efficiency acts against the full effectiveness of reforms, as the 
impressive branch opening is seen as a threat for efficiency and thus BCCs survival. 
To sum up, both individual behavior and local market conditions play a role in influencing 
BCC performance. This evidence is robust to the method used in estimating the efficiency equations. 
However, a limitation of the study is that it does not deal with the discernment of different sources of 
heterogeneity in individual BCC efficiency. Provided that local banking markets differ from each 
other and that embeddedness in the territory is part of the business-model of small banks, an extension 
of this analysis should provide a quantitative measure on “how much” location and individual factors 
explain BCCs heterogeneity. In other words, it would be valuable for academics and policy making to 
know how much of the difference in BCCs performance can be attributed to individual heterogeneity 
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and how much of this difference reflects local market conditions. Addressing this issue goes beyond 
the scope of this paper and is left for future work. 
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Table A1   Structure and behavior of Italian banking industry at provincial level over the years 2006-2011 
 
Market Concentration 
 
Bank Density 
   
  
HH1                                                        
Bank 
Branches 
HH2                      
Total 
Assets 
Q3 Market 
Shares 
Bank 
Branches 
Q5 Market 
Shares 
Bank 
Branches   
Branches 
by square 
Km 
Branches 
per 
Municipality 
Financial 
Development 
(Loans/Value 
Added) 
Loans/Deposits Bad Loans 
Agrigento 0.112 0.398 0.319 0.326  0.0005 3.880 0.540 0.973 9.026 
Alessandria 0.099 0.434 0.261 0.272  0.0009 1.598 0.973 1.615 6.724 
Ancona 0.075 0.287 0.134 0.134  0.0019 7.947 1.387 2.181 5.401 
Aosta 0.174 0.545 0.506 0.516  0.0003 1.313 0.617 0.896 4.734 
Arezzo 0.117 0.358 0.270 0.275  0.0007 6.432 1.077 1.822 5.791 
Ascoli Piceno 0.082 0.306 0.105 0.105  0.0013 3.543 1.088 1.696 6.154 
Asti 0.229 0.511 0.223 0.235  0.0011 1.357 0.963 1.610 4.191 
Avellino 0.122 0.293 0.103 0.109  0.0005 1.155 0.530 0.947 11.471 
Bari 0.076 0.305 0.188 0.189  0.0011 12.167 0.908 1.322 7.775 
Belluno 0.146 0.535 0.366 0.369  0.0005 2.876 0.688 1.468 4.274 
Benevento 0.104 0.313 0.116 0.148  0.0005 1.201 0.427 0.880 13.341 
Bergamo 0.086 0.469 0.220 0.220  0.0027 3.096 1.547 2.307 2.484 
Biella 0.195 0.325 0.117 0.135  0.0015 1.622 1.204 1.881 5.672 
Bologna 0.068 0.318 0.222 0.231  0.0023 14.926 1.421 1.730 3.092 
Bolzano 0.073 0.236 0.030 0.030  0.0006 3.579 1.439 2.125 2.519 
Brescia 0.064 0.354 0.186 0.188  0.0020 4.595 1.627 2.565 3.073 
Brindisi 0.096 0.336 0.190 0.190  0.0007 6.158 0.479 0.928 8.891 
Cagliari 0.241 0.437 0.165 0.165  0.0004 2.342 0.747 1.202 8.348 
Caltanissetta 0.114 0.385 0.309 0.319  0.0005 4.538 0.526 0.931 10.012 
Campobasso 0.108 0.388 0.208 0.217  0.0004 1.310 0.673 1.215 9.174 
Caserta 0.141 0.293 0.159 0.162  0.0008 2.016 0.523 1.086 10.374 
Catania 0.110 0.332 0.257 0.279  0.0010 6.325 0.789 1.340 7.256 
Catanzaro 0.089 0.323 0.198 0.198  0.0004 1.321 0.571 1.164 8.028 
Chieti 0.135 0.357 0.089 0.089  0.0007 1.729 0.832 1.435 5.801 
Como 0.096 0.593 0.295 0.295  0.0029 2.377 1.023 1.600 3.224 
Cosenza 0.102 0.305 0.116 0.117  0.0003 1.319 0.526 1.180 9.862 
Cremona 0.073 0.481 0.197 0.234  0.0016 2.507 1.105 1.947 3.848 
Crotone 0.149 0.270 0.084 0.084  0.0002 1.389 0.591 1.228 13.598 
Cuneo 0.092 0.398 0.178 0.188  0.0008 2.069 0.988 1.639 2.673 
Enna 0.142 0.434 0.327 0.332  0.0003 3.358 0.458 1.027 10.796 
Ferrara 0.140 0.322 0.191 0.192  0.0009 9.354 0.765 1.348 8.871 
(to be continued) 
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Firenze 0.083 0.267 0.232 0.239  0.0020 16.440 1.846 2.595 2.427 
Foggia 0.081 0.256 0.142 0.144  0.0003 3.951 0.758 1.236 8.432 
Forlì-Cesena 0.079 0.365 0.161 0.163  0.0015 11.700 1.363 1.935 3.641 
Frosinone 0.109 0.425 0.251 0.253  0.0006 2.234 0.487 1.209 13.363 
Genova 0.122 0.333 0.273 0.298  0.0029 7.866 0.977 1.279 3.548 
Gorizia 0.102 0.384 0.157 0.157  0.0023 4.353 0.813 1.372 6.174 
Grosseto 0.135 0.493 0.361 0.371  0.0003 5.595 0.887 1.716 4.743 
Imperia 0.113 0.478 0.281 0.294  0.0010 1.806 0.688 1.295 4.796 
Isernia 0.118 0.339 0.198 0.208  0.0002 0.663 0.495 1.255 16.860 
La Spezia 0.194 0.370 0.151 0.166  0.0016 4.281 0.770 1.334 5.217 
L'Aquila 0.122 0.332 0.134 0.134  0.0003 1.435 0.755 1.156 7.323 
Latina 0.106 0.337 0.299 0.301  0.0008 5.677 0.510 1.084 11.972 
Lecce 0.109 0.358 0.271 0.271  0.0009 2.730 0.608 1.190 7.079 
Lecco 0.093 0.472 0.226 0.228  0.0029 2.620 1.042 1.534 3.812 
Livorno 0.119 0.318 0.273 0.307  0.0017 10.425 0.960 1.940 3.188 
Lodi 0.113 0.505 0.233 0.273  0.0020 2.607 1.326 1.969 2.666 
Lucca 0.104 0.273 0.209 0.247  0.0015 7.819 1.234 2.024 4.796 
Macerata 0.111 0.247 0.089 0.089  0.0009 4.222 1.133 1.619 5.186 
Mantova 0.121 0.331 0.383 0.392  0.0014 4.816 1.266 2.538 3.003 
Massa 0.129 0.296 0.223 0.239  0.0010 6.539 0.929 1.548 5.570 
Matera 0.126 0.244 0.088 0.088  0.0002 2.747 0.628 1.074 18.449 
Messina 0.110 0.347 0.329 0.345  0.0007 2.167 0.586 1.196 8.923 
Milano 0.071 0.463 0.335 0.342  0.0129 13.471 3.454 3.046 1.270 
Modena 0.097 0.316 0.226 0.251  0.0019 10.645 1.312 2.144 3.764 
Napoli 0.121 0.268 0.186 0.191  0.0070 8.984 0.813 1.113 6.946 
Novara 0.122 0.445 0.295 0.335  0.0016 2.422 0.925 1.405 5.618 
Nuoro 0.537 0.418 0.076 0.076  0.0002 1.336 0.544 0.932 11.901 
Oristano 0.504 0.372 0.089 0.089  0.0003 0.924 0.475 0.957 9.091 
Padova 0.099 0.312 0.146 0.153  0.0030 6.196 1.284 1.878 3.979 
Palermo 0.117 0.365 0.257 0.265  0.0008 5.114 0.676 1.061 7.616 
Parma 0.112 0.229 0.158 0.167  0.0010 7.819 1.328 1.610 4.226 
Pavia 0.097 0.513 0.304 0.321  0.0011 1.767 0.758 1.211 5.614 
Perugia 0.075 0.320 0.232 0.234  0.0007 7.446 1.086 1.780 5.657 
Pesaro e Urbino 0.087 0.287 0.092 0.092  0.0012 5.364 1.242 1.870 5.314 
Pescara 0.085 0.309 0.097 0.097  0.0014 3.779 1.232 1.777 5.414 
Piacenza 0.125 0.230 0.135 0.142  0.0009 4.580 1.080 1.567 3.992 
Pisa 0.087 0.270 0.170 0.192  0.0011 7.577 0.963 1.698 4.563 
(continued) 
(to be continued) 
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Pistoia 0.107 0.303 0.153 0.160  0.0020 8.758 1.136 1.911 5.888 
Pordenone 0.107 0.382 0.157 0.161  0.0010 4.415 0.935 1.709 4.846 
Potenza 0.094 0.238 0.082 0.085  0.0003 1.663 0.521 1.139 14.869 
Prato 0.098 0.299 0.222 0.229  0.0039 20.119 1.450 2.132 5.383 
Ragusa 0.168 0.410 0.276 0.283  0.0008 10.236 0.892 1.613 8.134 
Ravenna 0.097 0.387 0.217 0.222  0.0018 18.639 1.284 2.116 2.386 
Reggio di Calabria 0.144 0.358 0.260 0.261  0.0004 1.436 0.426 0.970 12.377 
Reggio nell'Emilia 0.103 0.278 0.220 0.241  0.0018 9.056 1.381 2.031 3.525 
Rieti 0.169 0.387 0.159 0.159  0.0003 1.155 0.485 1.042 5.853 
Rimini 0.079 0.369 0.128 0.130  0.0034 11.462 1.435 2.143 4.104 
Roma 0.072 0.341 0.278 0.282  0.0038 16.953 1.579 1.501 4.342 
Rovigo 0.126 0.362 0.121 0.124  0.0010 3.663 0.852 1.583 6.362 
Salerno 0.075 0.310 0.177 0.179  0.0008 2.368 0.648 1.141 8.833 
Sassari 0.290 0.400 0.138 0.139  0.0003 2.310 0.964 1.739 8.169 
Savona 0.114 0.486 0.205 0.230  0.0012 2.727 0.885 1.566 3.990 
Siena 0.174 0.569 0.424 0.425  0.0006 6.134 2.501 2.843 1.639 
Siracusa 0.123 0.352 0.317 0.326  0.0006 6.056 0.661 1.303 9.105 
Sondrio 0.293 0.442 0.116 0.116  0.0004 1.618 1.352 1.983 1.430 
Taranto 0.094 0.342 0.270 0.270  0.0007 6.080 0.555 1.053 10.156 
Teramo 0.157 0.345 0.074 0.074  0.0010 3.957 0.961 1.496 7.485 
Terni 0.112 0.389 0.167 0.176  0.0006 4.040 0.797 1.425 6.087 
Torino 0.134 0.487 0.499 0.505  0.0017 3.611 0.935 1.219 3.315 
Trapani 0.110 0.412 0.334 0.340  0.0007 7.188 0.736 1.466 9.948 
Trento 0.036 0.506 0.131 0.137  0.0009 2.521 1.428 1.996 2.199 
Treviso 0.074 0.383 0.208 0.215  0.0027 6.954 1.419 1.924 3.615 
Trieste 0.126 0.457 0.327 0.330  0.0067 23.778 0.847 0.729 2.556 
Udine 0.079 0.409 0.150 0.152  0.0010 3.490 1.276 1.919 2.470 
Varese 0.089 0.473 0.250 0.258  0.0040 3.421 0.869 1.438 4.495 
Venezia 0.095 0.306 0.168 0.183  0.0021 11.864 0.919 1.665 3.450 
Verbano-Cusio-Ossola 0.175 0.437 0.230 0.268  0.0004 1.158 0.836 1.499 6.284 
Vercelli 0.193 0.423 0.195 0.231  0.0006 1.564 0.666 1.253 5.503 
Verona 0.101 0.343 0.236 0.272  0.0023 7.420 1.416 1.865 2.882 
Vibo Valentia 0.148 0.286 0.111 0.111  0.0004 0.813 0.392 0.948 12.642 
Vicenza 0.084 0.392 0.225 0.235  0.0024 5.455 1.293 2.208 4.236 
Viterbo 0.102 0.330 0.146 0.146  0.0006 3.422 0.717 1.408 6.032 
Italy 0.125 0.368 0.208 0.217  0.0014 5.291 0.968 1.548 6.381  
Source: own computation on data from Bank of Italy
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Table A2 Definition of the variables included in the cost and profit functions 
 
 
Variables  
 
 
Name 
 
 
Description 
 
y1 Loans Loans to customers. It includes current accounts, 
repurchase agreements, mortgages, credit cards, personal 
loans and salary-backed loans, transactions relating to 
financial leasing and factoring, business loans, structured 
debt securities and other securities 
 
y2 Commission Income Revenues arising from non-traditional loans and deposits 
of banks. It includes incomes from trading of financial 
instruments and currencies, custody and administration 
of securities, business consulting, management of 
insurance products, collection and payment services, 
collection services. 
 
y3 Securities Sum of loans to other banks, equities and bonds 
 
x1 Labor Number of employees 
 
x2 Capital Gross Banking Product, expressed as the sum of loans, 
direct and indirect funding. 
 
x3 Deposits Debts to customers 
 
w1 Labor cost Ratio of the personnel expenses to the number of 
employees 
 
w2 Cost of capital Ratio of the other expenses (commission expenses, 
operating costs, depreciation of fixed assets, the 
administrative costs that do not relate to personnel 
expenses and the interest expenses that do not relate to 
those calculated on deposits) to the Gross Banking 
Product 
 
 
w3 Cost of deposits Ratio of the interest expenses to the debts to customers 
 
Costs (y, w) 
 
 
 
Profits (y, w) 
Total costs 
 
 
 
Total profits 
w1x1 + w2x2 +  w3x3 = Administrative expenses + 
Depreciation of fixed assets +  Interest expenses + 
Operating costs + Commission expenses  
 
 



  1loglog minProfit  
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Table A3 Average values of input and output (2006-2011) 
(constant values in M of euro - NIC Index Istat, base year = 1995) 
Source: see table 1 
 
 
 
 
Variables Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
Cost 3766 161456.60 856024 378.2148 20100000 
Π 3766 10226.17 108520 -1040415 4395613 
Profit 3766 1050642 108520 1 5436029 
y1 = loans to customers 3766 1712072 8435175 1.45 182000000 
y2 = commission income 3766 27212.08 133176 0.72 2880022 
y3 = securities 3766 716470.30 5922604 206.47 154000000 
w1 = labor cost 3758 53.14 20.50 7.12 712.77 
w2 = cost of capital 3766 0.0595 1.0283 0.000048 44.81 
w3 = cost of deposits 3741 0.0135 0.0344 0.000008 1.25 
